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Book Reviews

Lynne V. Cheney: Humanities in America: A
Report to the President, the Congress, and the
American People. National Endowment for the
Humanities, September 1988.
Speaking for the Humanities: A Report from the
American Council of Learned Societies, in
Chronicle of Higher Education, Jan. 11, 1989,
A-ll-A-22.
Soldier, there is a war between the mind
And sky, between thought and day and night. It is
For that the poet is always in the sun,
Patches the moon together in his room
To his Virgilian cadences, up down,
Up down. It is a war that never ends.
Wall ace Stevens

As a rule, due reverence for the gift of life
forbids the waste of that precious substance
on official documents. Nonetheless, anyone
casually curious about the Humanities War,
the issues and the stakes, could in a short time
satisfy that curiosity with these latest communiques, for they are brief (about 15,000 words
each, I would guess). Though both call themselves "reports," both are manifestoes, declaring positions and soliciting the adhesion of the
reader. As manifestoes, both tend to the
polemical; no one would call them lively but
such vigor as they have depends upon their
tone of conviction, or even self-righteousness.
Neither really argues, though both make an
assiduous pretense at argument, sometimes
with statistics, often with appeals to authority,
most often by ringing affirmation. Each
depends on the other, for they are direly
opposed.
As with most wars, the origins of this one
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are obscure. Maybe it all started back in the
60's, with all that radical ferment that we
associate with such tags as civil rights, open
enrollments, relevance, affirmative action,
SDS, gay and lesbian rights, and perhaps most
important, a real war, a nasty war that engendered much national self-loathing, together
with even more patriotism, especially among
non-combatants. Or maybe the Humanities
War started with Ronald Reagan, who was
determined that the "Western tradition," in
its natural colors of red, white, and blue,
should again stand tall; for sure William Bennett's To Reclaim a Legacy is one of the main
events of the war. Or maybe the war goes all
the way back to Heidegger and Nietzsche, for
so avers Allan Bloom, whose own book must
be the war's most spectacular phenomenon.
(Yes, that's an erudite pun.)
Now, with clear intent to consolidate the
advances made by Bennett and Bloom, comes
this report ftom Lynne Cheney, Bennett's successor as chairman of the NEH. (We might
call their side the Whites.) A true staff officer, Cheney deployed "three advisory groups
in Washington" and "experts in the humanities at fourteen regional forums," and then
prepared this report (v). It is without question
puerile, as though Cheney really envisioned
Reagan as the target audience. Nonetheless,
with admirable concision it reveals what this
modern war is all about.
"The humanities," in Cheney's unexceptionable definition, "move us with images,
arguments, and stories about what it means
to be human: to be mortal and to mourn mortality for ourselves and those we love; to know
joy and find purpose, nonetheless; to be capa-
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ble of good and evil, wisdom and folly" (7).
Understood in such terms, the humanities
engage or ought to engage all of us, not just
scholars - those professional humans - but
people generally. And, says Cheney, the people are "enthusiastic" in their engagement,
and she has statistics to prove it: data on
humanities councils, library programs, historical associations, patronage of a "historical
documentary," money spent on "cultural
events" in comparison to "sports events," and
on and on. The humanities are alive and
flourishing with the people.
All the trouble comes from the mandarins
of culture - the professionals, the scholars,
which is to say the professors. (The Reds, we
might call them.) These intellectual types, having infiltrated academe in the late SO's and 60's
have in effect wrested from the people what
is theirs by natural right. The result: two
opposed cultures, "the academy and society"
(10). Another case, as Chaucer would say, of
the "shiten shepherde and a clene sheep."
Two complementary forces account for this
professorial coup de main: specialization and
Marxism. (Cheney never invokes Great Karl
by name but he is there, immanent, in her
words. Probably with good reason.) Specialization leads scholars to forget that humane
study, since it concerns love, death, and purpose, should serve everyone who worries
about such matters. But specialists learn to
talk to other specialists, not to students, not
to people generally. They find honor only
through "publication in refereed journals"
(11). In consequence, teaching is neglected and
the language of specialists becomes as exclusive as a secret handshake, and as trivial. Furthermore, insofar as these anti-social types
teach at all, they produce clones of themselves. To this effect Cheney quotes Leon
Kass: "Students are drawn into second-order

scholarly concerns even before they have
directly experienced the texts and the human
concerns that moved the authors to write
them" (11).
All this is as familiar as it is important and on this matter I think Cheney's position,
as distinct from her argument, is probably
right, or at least ponderable, especially when
she speaks of the scientism of the humanities,
that drive to pattern humane "research" on
the scientific model. Of course, Cheney will
convince no one with her hasty accusations,
but since she speaks for the NEH, with some
lovely money to dispense, she may inspire a
high-powered thinker to argue her case; if so,
we'll all benefit.
While the nature of humanities research is
of enormous intellectual interest, if the president (past or present) indeed reads this report,
he will find the section on "Politics and the
Curriculum" closer to his ideological heart.
For Cheney directs against the professors the
same charge which the Right levels against the
mass media: to wit, they are following a liberal
agenda. The professors subvert "Western
civilization" by taking a Marxist view of its
cultural triumphs. For Cheney the Western
heritage is a compendium of"truths that pass
beyond time and circumstance; truths that,
transcending accidents of class, race, and gender, speak to us all" (14). The professors, on
the other hand, see these same triumphs as
the means, consciously intended or otherwise,
of justifying and perpetuating those injustices
useful to the ruling class. Thus, says Cheney,
"Teaching becomes a form of political activism, with texts used to encourage students,
in the words of one professor, to 'work against
the political horrors of our time"' (12).
The horrors of our time? The real horror,
for Cheney, is that anyone would focus on
horrors (or "errors," as she prefers):
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Are [Western civilization and the American society] productive mainly of "political horrors" or have they not also seen [sic]
splendid achievements, persistent selfexamination, and decided progress toward
the goal of recognizing the dignity of every
human being? ... In what other civilization
have women and ethnic minorities
advanced further? In what other society
has social mobility so mitigated the effect
of class? (12)
Cheney never mentions the R-word relativism - hut her affinities with Bloom and
Bennett bring the word to mind. She knows,
or at least says, that "The Western tradition
is a debate," as opposed to a "consensus" (12).
But, I think, she cannot accommodate herself to the uncertainties, indeed the anxieties,
that such a view entails. Nor does she want
those uncertainties communicated to the
young; she is horrified that students may ask
of a text not wherein lies its "truth and beauty
and excellence" but rather "what groups did
the authors of these works represent" (12). She
worries thus: "What images of human possibility will American society put before its
members? ... will it find a place for grace, elegance, nobility ... ?" (3) Such worries arc by
no means foolish or inconsequential; only the
stoniest cynic would mock them. But I rather
think that Cheney values high culture as an
anodyne.
The amusing part of this report deals with
television. Perhaps it is inevitable that anyone so bullish on America should find television a positive force, another tool to be used
for good or ill, as society determines. Implicit
in the Industrial Revolution - the West's
most violent contribution to civilization - is
the faith that moral, social, and pedagogical
problems can be solved by new technologies,
especially those driven by market forces.
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Cheney shares that faith.
Cheney notes in the most perfunctory way
that Neil Postman is "concerned" about television as a "seductive" force, but in her entire
paper she indicates no awareness of the savagery and, in my view, the lethal cogency of
Postman's assault on television. For him, television is not a neutral tool to be used for
good or evil any more than Mephistophilis is
a dutiful servant. But Cheney knows nothing about any of this. So she offers a virtually unqualified encomium of television. What
she says in not worth re-stating: those tired
assurances that television is a medium distinct
from print, that television gets to those who
won't read and eventually sells them books,
that television "is not going to go away" (12),
that "scholars" might as well become involved
so that "television educates rather than misinforms" (21 ), that television can become "our
Lyceum, our Chautauqua, our Minsky's, and
our Camelot" (22). (Well, she may be right
about Minsky's.)
Cheney's comments on television are amusing because they are conditioned reflexes,
thought patterns shaped by television. Here
is her notion of how television might promote
an activity better than television: "It would
also be helpful, particularly in encouraging
young people to read, .. if series like 'The Cosby
Show' and 'Kate and Allie' showed books as
an important presence" (20). It is revealing to
see how Cheney uses the testimony of her
many experts. Over and over, she introduces
them as "author X" or "Professor Y" or "Dean
Z," as though this helps identify the expert
or certify the expertise. And then almost
invariably follows a vapid and unsupported
opinion - the roving reporter holding the
microphone before the man on the street: "'I
simply reject the idea,' [publisher Ellendea
Proffer] said, 'that only reading is good in an
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intellectual sense"' (19). So much for that
sound byte. Or another example:
"When I teach a class I find my students' imaginations are much more fully
stocked with vivid images of the rest of
the world than mine was when I was
young," [philosopher Michael] Novak
observed. "When I say 'armed guerrilla,'
they have a mental picture of an armed
guerrilla and know just how heavily
armed they are. Students don't learn that
from newspapers." (18)
In the last section of this report - to my
mind the most engaging - Cheney suggests
ways of bringing together art, literature, history, philosophy, and the people. The ways
include museum exhibits and tours, historical reconstructions (like colonial Williamsburg), "courses in Latin and Greek in small
towns" (24), lectures and Chautauquas and
the like. Such outreach programs would be
good for the scholar and good for the people.
I agree, and would add that if generously
funded, such a national effort would expand
and diversify the intelligentsia. It would, in
effect, promote what Adam Smith has for 200
years forbidden: the use of wealth for purposes
other than the production of more wealth, the
use of wealth for humane purposes. (Such use
implies a no-growth economy - a good thing,
in my view.)
I am not sure Cheney sees how revolutionary her suggestions are. It may be that she
does not have mega-dollars in mind, for she
seems to imply the efficient use of the mass
media, of technology. She may not realize that
it will do no good to have the few talking to
the many; it is necessary that people, many
learned people, talk to people who can talk
back. That means small groups - and more
money than lip readers want to pay.
Speaking for the Humanities speaks, actually,

for the American Council of Learned Societies and, less officially, for professorial
humanists. It was written by five directors of
humanities institutes and a dean of graduate
studies, hereinafter called the Learned
Speakers. They are moved to speak, stung, by
"the popular indictment of the humanities"
(11). But how does a "popular indictment"
manifest itself? The speakers imagine that the
popular sentiment is expressed by Bennett,
Bloom, and Cheney and so react against this
trio. "These attacks would be comic," the
Speakers observe, but since they are "politically significant" and "taken so seriously by
so many people," the Speakers feel constrained to mount a serious counterattack.
Speaking for the Humanities is more sophisticated, more thoughtprovoking, than Cheney's
report. Not that it is without its own comic
moments - as, for example, when the
Speakers solemnly refer "To the many who
have devoted their lives to work in the
humanities" (11). They refer not to those who
surrender themselves to a divine call to bring
light to dark and dangerous continents but
to us professors, to people with comfortable,
secure, enjoyable work, to the occupationally
privileged in a world where, by and large,
work means violence to human dignity. But
I will suppress all reference to the inadvertent
humor of the Speakers, for what they say
deserves our attention, maybe even our
devotion .
One of the most serious charges against the
humanities in the academy is that specialization, appropriate enough in the sciences,
where division of labor is made possible by
a controlling paradigm, works against the
humane endeavor to see things whole. The
Speakers' defense against this charge is cursory and implausible but its flaws are quite
revealing. In dealing with jargon, they do not
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ask why and when the special lingo of a discipline is useful. What little I know about economic jargon suggests that it promotes
precision and efficiency of discourse. Does
literary jargon, sometimes known as Theoryspeak, have such virtues? Good question,
which the Speakers only beg. They assert that
if jargon is good in physics, it must be good
in the humanities: "We do not expect physicists to work within their disciplines only in
a language that non-physicists might comprehend. Physicists speak to a popular culture
only when they are not doing the scientific
work that makes a difference in their fields"
(12).
Thus not only do the Speakers fail to make
a case for the Choctaw of scholarly writing
but they unwittingly confess their science
envy - exactly Cheney's accusation. They
offer three examples of specialized research
that yields "significant implications." One is
taken from biology: that old standby, "the
inherited characteristics of fruit flies" (12).
Another is taken from anthropology: Clifford
Geertz's "study of Balinese cockfighting" which is not about cockfighting unless Moby
Dick is about whaling (12). The third is
Natalie Zeman Davis' The Return of Martin
Guerre. These examples are ill chosen partly
because two of them are not from the humanities and partly because Geertz and Davis
avoid jargon and speak to people generally
about things that matter to people generally.
And to imagine that Geertz, who takes all
learning as his province, went to Bali to study
cockfighting is either sad or funny.
The Speakers further discredit their case by
the gratuitous venom they direct against
"amateurs - belle lettrists" (12). They fulminate against the "gentlemanly ideal: a vision
of the humanities as repository of known
truths and received values, which a non-
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professional corps of collectors present to the
young" (12). The problem here is not just the
straw man ruse: exactly who are these effete
and la-de-da amateurs? And if they exist and
are a really bad lot, how does that shore up
the case for specialization? More important,
it seems the Speakers have not reflected on
the dangers of "professionalism" or they would
not again and again use the word as an
unqualified encomium.
The Speakers behave a little more like
detached thinkers in the section titled "Objectivity and Ideology," where they deny all possibility of detached thought. In responding to
the charge of "relativism" and "politicized
teaching," they point out that the objectivity
and authority we usually attribute to science
have been undermined by theoreticians in all
disciplines, including the sciences: "the consensus of most of the dominant theories is that
all thought does, indeed, develop from particular standpoints, perspectives, interests"
(14). Consensus is a code word; decoded (or
encoded anew) it means that all we will ever
know of truth is expert opinion, or, more
accurately, the collective opinion at any given
moment of specialists, professionals.
Interests is a key word throughout this paper,
for underlying everything the Speakers say is
the belief that all acts, including speech acts
and thoughts, are efforts to impose self upon
the world. Such a view leads to a curious combination of cynicism and idealism. On the one
hand, they see past cultural monuments as
attempts to "promote as a norm the concerns
of a particular group and set aside as partial
or limited those of other groups" (16). But on
the other hand the Speakers themselves are
moved to promote not their own interests but
those of minorities, women, "the powerless,
the illiterate, the dispossessed" (22).
Perhaps there is no inconsistency here. Per-
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haps artists and philosophers of the past did
not have the benefit of modern selfconsciousness. To realize the subtle yet
endemic force of self-interest leads us to a salutary examination of oneself: "Allowing for the
probability of one's own interests, one can
look for irrational elements in otherwise
rational arguments, or for disguised ideological assumptions" (14 ).
So far, so plausible. But the Speakers in
their haste leave me a bit unsatisfied. I wonder why anyone would look into himself for
"the irrational elements in otherwise rational
arguments." Why bother to uncover the
shabby underside of one's "ideological
assumptions"? Here, as far as I can judge, is
the Speakers' answer:
The current debate about the humanities can itself be seen as emerging from
an ideological context since one of the
results of the contemporary interest in
theory and the critique of the foundations of knowledge in many disciplines
has been the realization that all stances
in scholarly research, as in the choice of
values, imply a prior commitment to
some basic belief system. The best contemporary work in the humanities strives
to make clear both its critique of the
ideologies of previous work, and its own
inevitable ideological blind spots.(14)
The argument of the first sentence is circular, winding with devious intent back upon
itself. Reduced to essentials it says: "The
debate is ideological because theory tells us all
'stances' are ideological." But what concerns
me here is not the syntactical legerdemain or
the tautology; it is that "prior commitment."
Prior to what? Apparently, prior to everything, especially to "scholarly research." The
best work simply takes off from the best "belief
system." The best workers are best because

they begin as selfcritical beings; they are solicitous of the interests of the dispossessed
because of their prior belief system.
I do not mean to insist on the arrant selfrighteousness of the Speakers. My point is
that, as far as I can tell, the Speakers are confused. They imagine that our "belief systems"
or "ideologies" or our interests determine our
approach to literature. My experience as a
reader and as a man tells me that literature
shapes our belief system, forms our ideologies,
informs our choice of values. When the
Speakers assert, later, that the "best work
characteristic of the humanities today has
renewed debates on value," that ringing affirmation rings false (14 ). They mean only that
those with a prior concern for the dispossessed
- that is, those with the right ideology know how to read.
In dealing with "Core Curriculum"- what
to read in college -the Speakers fairly bring
together the many considerations that have
opened up the canon and brought about a
crisis of authority. (They point out that the
authority and the consensus were never there
anyway.) These considerations are often but
not always of a political or social nature; many
diverse interests are demanding a piece of the
canon, to the dismay, the Speakers imply, of
"Western white males" (16). The everwidening definition of "text" brings in movies,
comic strips, greeting cards, bumper stickers,
toilet graffiti, etc.
The Speakers are quite right, I think, in seeing the curriculum debate as a sign of vigor
in the humanities. They rightly point out that
the chaos comes out of authentic and respectable differences in critical judgment: "most of
us carry around ... a list of famous writers,
artists, historical events. Why not simply
require knowledge of them and be done with
it? The list is too long and too short - too
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long to allow treatment of all, too short to
include members of anyone else's list" (17).
Under the circumstances, the Speakers convincingly maintain, humanities curricula have
changed very slowly and cautiously, and old
monuments still dominate the landscape. The
debate has not led to impulsive experiments.
In a section on "Teaching" the Speakers
take up, among other matters, a question of
great import: the relationship of research to
teaching. Their position will surprise no one:
"teaching and scholarship are properly a continuum" (20). They concede that "in the current academic marketplace scholarship has a
higher priority than teaching" (20), but they
still maintain that scholarship is a necessary
albeit not a sufficient condition of teaching.
In support of their position they offer nothing but the testimony of an expert witness,
"the President of Georgetown University,
Timothy S. Healy, S.]." This expert himself
contributes nothing but an assertion: "these
two great works stand as cause and effect"
(20). (Apparently, scholarship is the cause.)
This is not argument at all. If the Speakers
were not in such haste to be done with this
report, they might have gone beyond expert
opinions and asked some pertinent questions.
Are there different kinds of scholarship, some
of which is humane and significant, some of
which is not? Do the editors of learned journals know the difference and does it matter?
Is the scientific model useful for the humanities? In the sciences, hordes of merely competent workers can make real albeit
inconspicuous contributions to an enterprise
that makes progress. Is that true of the
humanities?
And there are still larger questions at issue,
which Father Healy unwittingly touches
upon: "When a student sees that the professor is the live embodiment of a discipline,
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when he understands in class or lab the excitement as well as the stress of discovery ... this
can turn his learning upside down ... " (20).
Isn't it possible to see the "disguised ideological assumption" that the life of the mind nay, less: the live embodiment of a discipline
- is the highest destiny and exactly the ideal
to offer the young? Isn't it possible that one
of Cheney's expert witnesses, Leon Kass, is
closer to the truth when he speaks of "secondorder scholarly concerns" displacing "human
concerns"? I do not intend to argue here by
way of rhetorical question. These are real
questions and they ought to trouble us all.
The Speakers, in their utter self-assurance,
give no sign they have ever considered such
questions.
I have reviewed only some of the issues over
which the Humanities War is being fought.
These issues, I think, are of great consequence.
Indeed, my main point throughout this review
is that this war is far too important to be left
to the generals, for the generals on both sides
have woefully let us down. They do not
inspire loyalty. As far as I can tell, the generals
don't even know the true location of the battlefield. For that piece of vital information we
must turn, or return, to Wallace Stevens, per
my epigraph.
Anthony Parise

Charles]. Sykes, ProfScam: Professors and the
Demise of Higher Education, Washington,
D.C.: Regnery Gateway, 1988.
Mr. Sykes's book, ProjScam, as the title
implies, is an angry, vitriolic, and outrageous
diatribe against the American higher education establishment in general, and professors
in particular. The book is sensationalist in
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